Baudrillard, J. (1994). Simulacra and Simulations. Michigan: University of Michigan Press.
The Terminator (1984) Directed by James Cameron. 103 mins. MGM. Off-air recording. [DVD disk] NB. In the text refer to (Cameron 1984)
Dick, P.K. (2001) Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? London: Gollancz.
Kerman, J.B. (ed.) (1997) Retrofitting Blade Runner. 2nd edition. Bowling Green: Bowling Green University Press.
The Empire Strikes Back (1980) Directed by Irvin Kershner. 124 mins. Lucas Film Limited. Off-air recording. [DVD disk] MB. In text refer to (Kershner 1980)
Lyotard, J.F. (1991) The Inhuman. Stanford: Stanford University Press
Malpas, S. (2005) The Postmodern: the New Critical Idiom. Oxon: Routledge.
Redmond, S. (2008) Studying Blade Runner. Leighton Buzzard: Auteur. Sim, S. (ed) (2005) The
Routledge Guide to Postmodernism. 2nd edition. Oxon: Routledge.
Blade Runner (1991) Directed by Ridley Scott. 122 mins. Warner Bros. Off air recording. [DVD disk] MB. In text refer to (Scott 1991)
Wheale, N. (1995) Post Modern Art: An Introductory Reader. London: Routledge.
Thursday 19 January 2012
Like Tears In Rain
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a_saUN4j7Gw&feature=related
This is a clip of Batty's final moments. Auguably obe of the most moving scenes of the film.
This is a clip of Batty's final moments. Auguably obe of the most moving scenes of the film.
Humans and Androids; It's All Gone Confusing!
In the previous entries I looked at a selection of postmodern commentators and critics to who have considered aspect of postmodernism that concern simulation, the inhuman, cyborgs, robots and replicants. These are all topics that feature in many science fiction novels and films, especially in terms of the robot, android and the cyborg. Most people are familiar with at least one of these artificial life forms whether it be killer cyborg from James Cameron’s The Terminator (1984) or the bickering but lovable droids R2 D2 and C3PO from George Lucas’ Star Wars franchise (1977, 1980, 1983, 1999, 2002 and 2005). Although the Terminator (Arnold Schwarzenegger) and R2 D2 (Kenny Baker) and C3P0 (Antony Daniels) all have human attributes there is usually some aspect that distinguishes the artificial individual from the real human being; a kind of detachment. Once the Terminator loses its fleshy covering it is obvious it
is a robot (Cameron 1984), and the R2 D2 and C3P0 are obviously mechanical entities (Kershner 1980). However, in the realms of science fiction exists another type artificial being that differs from the now archetype mechanical robot. In Philip K. Dick’s classic science fiction novel Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep (1968) and Ridley Scott’s film adaptation Blade Runner: The Directors Cut (1991) we are presented with androids of a different type. These androids are made of organic material, the Nexus 6 android, and, as their creator, Tyrell (Joe Turkel), from Blade Runner boasts, ‘More human than human” is our motto’ (Scott 1991). According to Wheale, Recent science fiction has perfected the category of the soft robot, combining hints from genetic engineering, cloning and micro surgery to produce the android, or as Blade Runner categorises them, replicants’ (Wheale 1995: p.101). These soft robots are so similar to
actual human beings it is impossible to tell them apart. The replicants, or andys as they are called in Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep, manage to live among human unnoticed. This leads us to a very important philosophical question. What happens if androids become his sophisticated, if androids become more human than human? Could it be possible that, in the future, androids could become so advanced that apart from the fact they were manufactured there is absolutely no difference between them and us?
Science fiction has for many years considered the possibility of artificial intelligence. This has been explored in both literature and film alike from Ian M. Banks’ Consider Phlebas (1987) to Stanley Kubrick’s epic film 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968). This interest in thinking machines has lead to many questions in science fiction. One common question is what happens when artificial inelegance, or AI, considers itself superior to humans. We see this in The Terminator where in the future AI turns on its human masters and attempts annihilate them in a nuclear attack. In the Routledge Guide to Postmodernism Ian Hamilton Grant explains about real AI experiments where computers are encouraged to learn as opposed to simply be programmed,
learning makes connections between things rather than mining a thing for as much information
about it as possible. In AI, this approach is therefore called ‘connectionism’, and hardware learns through such means is called a ‘neural net’, eradicating the difference between real and artificial neurons. Rather than the image of arborescent supercomputers such as HAL 9000 from the film 2001: A Space Odyssey, which must be programmed with intelligent functions, neural nets from
rhizomatic networks of computers that interact with each other and, through this interaction, resolve random input into emergent patterns, thus actually learning (Ed Sim 2005: p.66).
about it as possible. In AI, this approach is therefore called ‘connectionism’, and hardware learns through such means is called a ‘neural net’, eradicating the difference between real and artificial neurons. Rather than the image of arborescent supercomputers such as HAL 9000 from the film 2001: A Space Odyssey, which must be programmed with intelligent functions, neural nets from
rhizomatic networks of computers that interact with each other and, through this interaction, resolve random input into emergent patterns, thus actually learning (Ed Sim 2005: p.66).
In other words instead of these computers being programmed they actually learn like a human does. It could be argued that the word ‘learning’has a biological connotation to it. As is pointed out, in this situation the differences that are real neurons and artificial neurons are eradicated. Baudrillard’s simulation has been realised in the development of AI.
This ability for neural development is present in the replicant. In Blade Runner Deckard’s superior, Captain Bryant (M. Emmet Walsh), tells him that the Nexus 6 model androids only have a four year life span. This is so they do not develop emotional responses identical to those of humans. Having the ability the feel emotional responses can cause problems for the Nexus 6 so they are implanted with false memories to help them deal with their emotions (Scott 1991). It could be argued that this is a logical approach as the Nexus 6 is, strait from manufacture, brought into being as a fully functioning adult and has lacked the emotional maturing human
being develop as they grow from childhood to adulthood (Ed Kerman: 1997 p.10). The character Rachael (Sean Young) is a replicant but she is unaware of the fact until Deckard tells hers. She had been implanted with the memories of Tyrell’s niece. As far as she was concerned she was Tyrell’s niece. Wheale asks, ‘What would be the difference between a physically perfect android kitted out with memories and emotions passably like our own, and a person nurtured through the usual channels’ (Wheale 1995: p.102). It is a fair enough question to ask. Rachael, for all intents and purposes, is identical to a human being. The only difference is she was manufactured and programmed. Even though the replicants have been programmed and had memories uploaded into their brains they still have the capacity to learn and develop both emotionally and morally. We can see this in the antagonist, Batty (Rutger Hauer), towards the end of the film at the climax of his and Deckard’s final encounter. Batty, aware that his life is almost at an end, saves Deckard, who up until this moment would have retired him, the euphemism used by blade runners for killing replicants, from falling to his death. Batty was enraged by Deckard’s retiring of his lover Pris (Daryl Hannah), yet still had the compassion, or arguably the humanity, to prevent Deckard from falling. This act of compassion is followed by Batty’s touching and emotionally charged final words, ‘I've seen things you people wouldn't believe. Attack ships on fire off the shoulder of Orion. I watched C-beamsglitter in the dark near the Tannhauser gate. All those moments will be lost in time... like tears in rain... Time to die’ (Scott 1991). The emotion in Batty’s face as he delivers the speech is obvious and undeniably human. It is as if in his last moments he actually became human. It could be argued, taking into consideration the human attitude towards replicants, who are nothing more than slaves, that Batty became more than human. Again we see the distinction between false and real distorted. The simulated is indistinguishable from the real.
being develop as they grow from childhood to adulthood (Ed Kerman: 1997 p.10). The character Rachael (Sean Young) is a replicant but she is unaware of the fact until Deckard tells hers. She had been implanted with the memories of Tyrell’s niece. As far as she was concerned she was Tyrell’s niece. Wheale asks, ‘What would be the difference between a physically perfect android kitted out with memories and emotions passably like our own, and a person nurtured through the usual channels’ (Wheale 1995: p.102). It is a fair enough question to ask. Rachael, for all intents and purposes, is identical to a human being. The only difference is she was manufactured and programmed. Even though the replicants have been programmed and had memories uploaded into their brains they still have the capacity to learn and develop both emotionally and morally. We can see this in the antagonist, Batty (Rutger Hauer), towards the end of the film at the climax of his and Deckard’s final encounter. Batty, aware that his life is almost at an end, saves Deckard, who up until this moment would have retired him, the euphemism used by blade runners for killing replicants, from falling to his death. Batty was enraged by Deckard’s retiring of his lover Pris (Daryl Hannah), yet still had the compassion, or arguably the humanity, to prevent Deckard from falling. This act of compassion is followed by Batty’s touching and emotionally charged final words, ‘I've seen things you people wouldn't believe. Attack ships on fire off the shoulder of Orion. I watched C-beamsglitter in the dark near the Tannhauser gate. All those moments will be lost in time... like tears in rain... Time to die’ (Scott 1991). The emotion in Batty’s face as he delivers the speech is obvious and undeniably human. It is as if in his last moments he actually became human. It could be argued, taking into consideration the human attitude towards replicants, who are nothing more than slaves, that Batty became more than human. Again we see the distinction between false and real distorted. The simulated is indistinguishable from the real.
Batty’s compassionate actions towards Deckard juxtaposed with the human inability to show any empathy for the plight of the replicants is interesting, especially when compared with Lyotard’s theories on the Inhuman. The replicants show loyalty to one another while Pris and Batty are lovers, as are Deckard and Rachael. They demonstrate the most human of emotions; love, while the humans seem cold and lack empathy. The character Gaff (Edward James Olmos) is described by Captain Bryant as, ‘a goddamned one-man slaughterhouse’ (Scott 1991). Bryant himself showed absolutely no compassion or empathy for replicants either, while admittedly Batty’s group were guilty of murder, Rachael, who had been put on Deckard’s retirement list, had never harmed a human being. Batty’s group were not even offered the chance of a fair trial. They were designed and always intended to be slaves. The replicants had no rights whatsoever. This lack of humanity in the face of growing technology corresponds perfectly to Lyotard’s inhuman as the humans seem to have lost any sense of humanity towards the replicants and, emotionally appear to be changing places with them. The creators are at risk of the simulacra that they have created over taking them in terms of humanity. If this is what is happening with the Nexus 6, what would the Nexus 7 or 8s going to be like, or a Nexus 6 with an extended life and the greater possibilities for emotional growth. This would bring into question the entire concept of being human where the simulated is equal to the none simulated. Imagine the implications of a ‘soft robot’ that was manufactured but could breed with another robot or even a human. This would surely bring into
question what the essence of humanity and redefine what life actually means.
Nigel Wheale
British author Nigel Wheale’s book, Postmodern Arts: An Introduction he dedicates a chapter, Recognising a ‘human-Thing’: Cyborgs, Robots and Replicants in Philip K. Dick’s to Philip K. Dick’s Do Androids dream of Electric Sheep?, and Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner to both the classic book and film. Wheale states in the peace, ‘I concentrate on the central theme of both the novel and the film; the conflict between authentic and artificial personality, that is, between people and robots (Wheale 1995: p.101). Wheale considers the philosophical consequences of androids becoming ever more human like as he explores some of the central themes of the two science fiction works as he ponders how close to humanity will technology take us as we draw ever closer to the ‘human-Thing’. These are questions that I will explore further in my next entry.
Cyborg Manifesto Manga Style.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IQiwRrR-LeE&feature=endscreen&NR=1
This film is a mantage of Manga clips that gives a visual explanation to Haraway's Cyborg Manifesto.
This film is a mantage of Manga clips that gives a visual explanation to Haraway's Cyborg Manifesto.
Lyotard, Haraway, Crborgs and the Inhuman
Another French contributor to postmodernitist theory is Jean-Francois Lyotard. A notable a relevant publication of Lyotard’s was The Inhuman: Reflections on Time (1991). Here Lyotard argues that the basis of humanism in the contemporary world is under threat from both technology and capitalism. If this is the case he suggests that the result would be a dehumanising event (Malpas 2005: p76). In The Inhuman: Reflections on Time Lyotard makes an interesting argument about the distinction between a living organism and a machine. He argues,
You know – technology wasn’t invented by us humans. Rather the other way round. As anthropologists and biologists admit, even the simplest life forms, infusoria, tiny algae synthesized by light at the edges of tide pools a few million years ago, are already technical devices. Any material system is technological if it filters information used to its survival, if it memorises and processes that information and make inferences based on the regulating effect of behaviour, this is, if it intervenes on and imparts its environment so as to ensure its perpetuation (Lyotard 1991: p.12)
In other words, what Lyotard is claiming is that all life on Earth are manifestations of biological machines. From the smallest single celled organism to human beings. This suggests that the technology we create is but an extension of an already existing technology. Does this then nullify the concept of the cyborg? By its very definition a machine connected to another machine can not only be a machine with another machine added to it. However, cyborg theorist Donna Haraway suggests, ‘we are all chimeras, theorised and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism: in short, we are all cyborgs’ (Haraway 1991: p.150). To understand what Haraway means we only have to consider our ever day use of machines and technology. If we need to get somewhere fast we use a machine to get us there, for example a car, boat or an aeroplane. We constantly rely on computers. In fact in the west technology has permeated almost every part of our lives. To summarise I will paraphrase Malpas, Haraway the our reliance on, and relationship with, technology brings us closer to bridging the gap between sexual hierarchies and signals an end to
cultural stereo types while Lyotard fears that it turns us into parts of the capitalist machine (Malpas 2005: p.78).
cultural stereo types while Lyotard fears that it turns us into parts of the capitalist machine (Malpas 2005: p.78).
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